STORM 126 (Mars 2014)

STORM

No. 126                     Public Information Bulletin of Australian National Action                     Mars 2014

ANA accept no responsibility for information provided/inferred. STORM is an information source only

STORM gets information from ‘insiders’, SCUTTLEBUTT. We can’t confirm their stories. The latest:

ASIAN-AUSTRALIANS: An Asian looking woman complained: “there are too many Asians coming to Australia!” We were puzzled. “But aren’t you from Asia?” “By way of Portugal!” she said, acting offended. Portugal? She’s from East Timor, so is racially-mixed. Portuguese rulers encouraged race-mixing between their white, black and yellow-skinned subjects from 1511 AD onwards. Difficult today to find a pure-race descendant of the Portuguese Empire. Just look at Brazil. Empire collapsed in 1974. Many Timorese, like this woman, migrated to Australia. Second-generation migrants think themselves ‘Aussies’, but no one else does.

WALLOON GYPSY: A 77 year-old man told us: “my name is German but I’m not German. I’m a Walloon. We’re Gypsies. That’s why we’re slightly browner than other Europeans. Most Walloons live in Belgium but many have spread throughout Europe. Our people are natural metal workers of tin, silver and gold”.

BOOK REVIEW: The Reporter and the Warlords by Craig Collie (Crow Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1989).
OBSCURE EX-PAT: The biography of W.H. ‘Don’ Donald, Australian journalist. After working at the Sydney Daily Telegraph and Melbourne Argus at age 28 Don in May 1903 became editor of Hong Kong'S China Mail. Don moved to China and never left, dying there in November 1946 aged 71 years at Shanghai’s Country Hospital.

‘AUSTRALIAN’S IMPACT ON ASIA’: This book was given us by a Malay-Chinese who said: ‘you should know the impact Australians have in Asia’. Intrigued, our first question was ‘why’s no one heard of Don?’ He left Australia in 1903 and never returned. He ‘fell in love’ with China and saw no reason to leave. Like most Western ‘advisers’ there, Don enjoyed a power and lifestyle he could only imagine in their home country. So what did Don achieve in 43 years as an expat?* He arrived eight years before the end of Manchu-rule in China. In 1911 China became a Republic, a democracy in name only. Without strong Central government power as exercised by the emperor’s since 1700BC, power devolved to the Empire’s regional governors.

FOREIGN ADVISERS TO CHINA: Don did his best to give good advice, first to the Manchu’s 1903-08 (pp.38-47) and then to Sun Yatsen’s rebel Republican forces 1908-11 (pp. 48-54ff). Suns’ rebels succeeded in 1911 at overthrowing foreign/Manchu rule. Don became adviser, first to Sun (pp.101-108) then in 1928, to Zhang Xueliang - ‘Young Marshal’, ‘warlord’ of Manchuria**. Zhang’s father, Zhang Zuolin, was Manchu regional governor and President of China in 1927 before being assassinated in the endless power struggles that paralysed China 1911-27. On his death the governorship devolved to his son, an example of Chinese ‘democracy’ in action.

WHY FOREIGN ADVISERS? The Chinese, as seen in 55 Days at Peking a Hollywood film, about the failed 1900 Boxer Rebellion, were assailed by a dozen European powers including the US and Japan. Occupied by foreign armies and bullied by their Ambassadors/Special Envoys each demanding their ‘piece’ of China. The besieged and weakening Manchus could not resist. But passive resistance was another thing. One thing the ‘foreign powers’ had in common was they all were jealous of each other. No one could annex or colonise China outright if opposed by others. One Chinese defence mechanism was to hire foreigners to advise them on how to deal with foreign governments, both others and their own. Don was one such ‘adviser’.

DUAL ROLE ‘ADVISERS’: The Manchus/Chinese showed their innate cunning. Many journalists – British, Australian, or American – were used by the M/C’s as paid or unpaid ‘advisers’. What did these gain from it? They not only got to cover a story from the inside with privileged access to sources, they got to make the news. Every egotistical news-hound dreams: ‘If only I ran the country’. Now they could: power without glory. In China foreign journalists got to formulate solutions. In this way the Chinese ‘played’ foreigners against each another.

OTHER ADVISERS: After working for the YM Don was hired by President of China, General Chiang Kai-shek. Don found the taciturn general difficult to get one with but Don worked very well with his wife, Mai-ling. Others advisers working for the Chinese were: American journalist George Bronson Rea, co-founder with Don of the Far Eastern Review. Dr George Morrison, reporter for The [London] Times; Rev George Shepherd, a NZ missionary; Ilona Sues, a Pole; American Captain Walter Stennes; German general Alexander von Falkenhausen; Anderson Roy, of the Standard –Vacuum Oil Co and  Earl Selles, an American journalist. The Chinese used of these foreigners to ‘curry favour’ with Western public opinion. Did Don and other ‘advisers’ have any real impact?

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: Don helped win the Russo-Japanese War for Japan. (p.26ff). How? Don was ‘Asian correspondent’ for various British newspapers. 1902-22 Britain and Japan had a formal military alliance. When the Russo-Japanese War began in 1904, British newspapers were jingoistic i.e. stridently pro-Japanese and virulently anti-Russian. The London Daily Express sent an urgent message to Don: ‘find Russia’s Baltic Fleet. Lost contact since left Red Sea’. There is a fine line these days between biased and unbiased reporting, a line the US media often cross. Another ‘line’ is between journalism and spying. Don crossed that line; his instrumental role in helping Britain’s ally, Japan, defeat the Russian Empire and so aided their rise to power in North Asia.

BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA: In the early stages of the 1904 War Russia’s Pacific Fleet was trapped by the Japanese at Port Arthur. This was a part of China the Japanese had captured in their 1894 War. In 1895 Japan was forced to surrender it to Russia by ‘The Western Powers’. Angered by this, Japan’s first move was to ally with Britain, one of the Western Powers, then used this alliance as the basis to wage war against Russia. Why would Britain ally with Japan? Is the same question asked earlier, in 1854, when the Crimean War took place and Britain was allied with Ottoman Turkey against Russia. In 1917 the British government refused entry to the Tsar’s family when they sought to flee the Bolsheviks, leading directly to their deaths.

BALANCE OF POWER: For hundreds of years Britain had opposed the domination of Europe by any one power. Lead to war with France for centuries, then after 1870 with a united Germany in 1914 and 1939. The British called this ‘maintaining the Balance of Power in Europe’. Europeans saw it as selfish meddling to permanently destabilise them. In 1949, when de Gaulle and Adenauer met to form the EU, they specifically barred Britain. Britain wasn’t allowed in till 1972. After 1941 the US took over this ‘balance’ role in Europe as Britain was now too weak. This explains the actions of the US/UK towards Serbia in 1999 and Russia in Eastern Europe since 1989 including the Ukraine today.

A SPY FOR JAPAN: Back to 1904. The Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet needed ‘reinforcements’ to lift to blockade of Port Arthur. Isolated from all European aid through British pressure the Russians were forced to send their only other fleet, from the Black Sea. Don and the other British ‘media’ acted as spies for the British government, and for the Japanese, relaying to them all reports of Russian naval movements. As the Black Sea Fleet headed north along the Chinese coastline it had to pass Don’s home base, Hong Kong. Don was ordered to locate them, which he did (p. 31). His information allowed the Japanese to set a trap for the Black Sea Fleet, thus winning the war for Japan. Thanks to Don, Thousands of Russians died. Port Arthur surrendered.

BOLSTER FOR BOLSHEVIKS: As a direct result of Japan's victory Lenin and other Communists, sensing the Tsar’s ‘weakness’, staged the 1905 Insurrection. It failed but was a good ‘dry run’ for the later October 1917 Coup, the so-called Revolution. 1905 was an ‘unintended consequence’ of Britain ‘aiding an ally’. The 1905 revolt projected Lenin & Co into the limelight of the world’s media. The 1917 Coup lead to Germany’s defeat in 1945. How? By deposing the ineffectual Tsars and replacing them with totalitarian Stalinism. It was this which defeated the forces of A.Hitler at Moscow and Stalingrad. Don’s role in History was not always a happy one.

WEST CUTS AID TO MANCHUS: In 1908 Don got the Western Powers, i.e. Europeans, ‘on side’ with China’s Republicans, lead by Sun Yat-sen. Don personally drafted a letter, signed by local Republican leaders, guaranteeing the West’s representatives in Shanghai that their various colonial enclaves in China would be left ‘untouched’. After the ‘transition’ to non-Manchu rule, they were told, it would be ‘business as usual’ (pp.70-72). The Western Powers subsequently refused all requests for military aid from the Manchu government, dooming them. Unable to defend itself, the regime crumbled. Don became New York Herald ‘China correspondent’ allowing him to ‘sell’ Sun Yat-sen and the Republican cause directly to the US public (p.48).
 
SIAN INCIDENT: In 1936 Don brokered the historic Sian Agreement. This ended the Chinese Civil War which had raged since 1927 between China’s Nationalists and Communists. The agreement forced Nationalist President, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to ally with Mao Zedong’s Communist rebels. They stopped fighting each other and instead both fought the invading Japanese (p.230). *** Chiang never forgave either Don or the Young Marshal, believing both had cost him rule of China (P.313).

 *[‘Expatriate’ is a term for Australians who emigrate to other countries feeling Australia is ‘too small’ for them .Over 15% of our population now live overseas]. 

**[‘Warlord’ is a derogatory term used by Leftist/Western media to ‘pigeonhole’ the Chinese stopgap between monarchy and democracy. Similar events occurred in 1989 after Russia lost control of its empire in Eastern Europe. Armed groups battle each other; political fractions ally, fragment and re-ally. Is natural ‘shakeout’ when a totalitarian system dies].

***How did Don do it? In 4th Decembis 1936 Chiang was visiting Sian province on a routine ‘troop inspection’ tour when he was seized by Manchurian soldiers. In 1931 these had been ordered to flee their home province by Chiang rather than oppose the invading Japanese Army. Chiang thought China not yet ‘ready’ for a full-scale war with Japan. 

MANCHU PRIDE: He was right but the retreat of the entire Manchurian Army without a fight lead to them being ridiculed across China as ‘deserters’. Even today, history textbooks show them in a bad light. Angered at their ‘loss of face’ the Manchus demanded Chiang allow them to return to Manchuria to ‘fight the foreign invader’ i.e. Japan. Chiang was adamant he had made the right decision. He now threatened the Manchurians with harsh penalties. They felt they had no choice but to ‘arrest’ Chiang for their own protection. He attempted an escape and fell from a hotel window. Suffering bad injuries but denied medical attention, Chiang held out for two weeks, refusing to sign any ‘truce’. Neither side would budge so the Manchurians sent for Don. 

DON, THE DEAL-MAKER: Both sides asked him to negotiate for them. His strong anti-Japanese sentiments, possibly a result of his role in the Pt Arthur battle, lead him to urge a truce. Don inadvertently condemned China to becoming a Communist state after 1945. Chiang’s strategic view was correct, but in 1936 no one else agreed with it. Thanks to Don Chiang was forced to stop pursuing Mao and became his ally instead (p.243). With Japan’s defeat in 1945 the Chinese Civil War resumed. By now, however, Chiang’s forces had lost the ‘initiative’ to Mao’s Communist Armies.

TAIWAN ESCAPE: By 1949 the Civil War was over. Chiang’s defeated troops fled offshore, to Taiwan. Only the intervention of the US Fleet prevented their annihilation. After signing the Sian Agreement Chiang had the Young Marshal, Don’s protégé and commander of the unruly Manchurians, arrested. When Chiang fled to Taiwan he took the Young Marshal along. YM was still a prisoner in 1990, making him “the world’s longest serving political prisoner” (p. 313). Young Marshal outlived Chiang, dying in 2001 aged 100 years old.

BOOK REVIEW: Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy by Dr Colonel-general Dmitri Volkogonov (Moscow: Novosti/London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989).

 “On 14 April 1941 Churchill sent a report to Stalin. It alleged Germany was ‘redeploying large numbers of their Armed Forces to the East’. Stalin dismissed this as ‘yet another attempt by the English to provoke Russia into a war with Germany’. So on 14th June 1941 he ordered TASS to publish a Statement in Berlin ‘dismissing the rumour of German troop concentrations on the borders of the USSR as nonsense and clumsy propaganda by forces hostile to both Germany and the USSR’. This strange statement had a profoundly disorienting affect.  Read by millions of Soviet citizens and its entire armed forces, it was understood everywhere in the same way: ‘the government is not concerned. Neither should we be.’  People became convinced war was unlikely” (p.391).

“G.K. Zhukov was appointed Chief of the General Staff in February 1941. On the 15th May 1941, he urged Stalin to launch a preemptive strike on Germany as ‘Germany is now fully mobilized and able to surprise us with a sudden attack, I think it essential we forestall their forces during deployment by attacking them before they have time to be fully organized’. Five weeks before the battle, Zhukov was proposing the Soviet Union attack Germany” (p.398). [emphasis ours]


“In early March 1941 Chief of Military Intelligence, F.I. Golokov reported to Stalin: ‘the Wehrmacht has eight million men, 12 thousand tanks, 52 thousand guns and 20 thousand aircraft’ ” (p.399). 

“Zhukov later said: ‘Stalin resisted all attempts by the military leadership to put our troops on alert along the western border’(p.400) Stalin’s behavior was dictated by a realization of the consequences of a premature war.  He was deeply insecure. The USSR had faced the Capitalist world alone. Berlin concluded this had made the USSR ‘weak’. The Germans deduced caution had become indecisiveness. (p.401) They attacked the USSR at 4am, 22nd June 1941. (p.402). Stalin ordered Foreign Minister Molotov to phone the German embassy to ask: ‘why’? They replied: ‘Germany is forestalling an attack by the Russia’ (p.404). [emphasis ours]

P O Box 635 Strathpine PS 4500 Australia  phone 0448 187 582

Email: australiannationlaction@yahoo.com.au

australiannationalaction2.blogspot.com.au/